Did decolonization mark a major change in World Politics?

This essay seeks to show that decolonization was instrumental to major changes in world politics. Even though a plethora of changes, positive and negative, minor and major can be attributed to decolonization, it is recognized that the liberal definition of what constitutes a major change, particularly self-determination and the constructivist perspective of values, identity, ideas and wide reaching normative change, differs from the realist perspective that a major change constitutes a shift in the balance of power. The limitations of this realist perspective are addressed. Self-determination and sovereignty of prior colonies in Asia and Africa are presented as symbolically important divergent from the realist suggestion that the actual exercising of sovereignty by weaker or ‘quasi’ states is of minimal impact in world politics. It is also presented here that contemporary events in world politics, such as the growing norm of human intervention and its apparent infringement on sovereignty has some of its origins traced back to decolonization. The liberal position that central to impact of decolonization on world politics was the changing and growing role of international institutions, is argued to be congruent with the constructivist view that the meanings and interpretations are significant.


This assessment starts by firstly contrasting the contending paradigms of theoretical framework of realism, liberalism and constructivism, their understanding of decolonization, the international system, sovereignty and what constitutes a major change in world politics. There is analysis of transformations and continuities in world politics and the ‘expansion of the international society’ , prior to and after decolonization to identify when, where, why and how they can be attributed to decolonization. Understanding changes in the post colonial relationship is indispensable to this assessment and brief references are made to the Commonwealth and Francophone states. An appraisal is made of the impact of changing composition of International Institutions notably the United Nations, the impact of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The impact of decolonization in India on contemporary world politics is evaluated and a brief conclusion summarizes key findings.



Understanding Decolonization - What does each theoretical framework say?

According to Duara: “… decolonization refers to the process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation-states … decolonization represented not only the transference of legal sovereignty, but a movement for moral justice and political solidarity against imperialism.” (Duara, 2004).

It isn’t uncommon for liberal accounts of decolonization to use a chronology that begins with the signing of The Charter of the United Nations in 1945 followed by a growing tide of nationalism in Africa and Asia. There were provisions in the charter supporting normative ideas and values of equal rights and self determination of all peoples. According to Paul Lauren, for nationalist leaders in Africa and Asia, this provision “bolstered their spirits further” (Lauren, 1988). This gave impetus to normative framework change of human rights and self-determination that made imperialism unfashionable and independence inevitable. Robert Jackson notes: “Demands for independence based on equality and self-determination eventually deprived colonialism of its moral defenses and put in its place alternative norms for justifying independent statehood” (Jackson, 1993).

Realists pay a lot less attention to normative notions in world politics. In trying to comprehend the impact of decolonization, they focus on its effect on power and the security interests of states. They may make reference to growing military and humanitarian intervention as evidence that decolonization did not give absolute sovereignty to newly independent states. Stephen Krasner asks pertinent questions that both liberals and realists ask themselves. “What do Third World countries want? How can they get it? What should the North do? What is the long term prognosis for North-South relations?” (Krasner S. D., 1985). Realists answer these questions with power, control and politics as the backdrop whilst liberals accentuate self-determination, normative change, economics and the role of institutions. Realists attribute the motivations of the developing nations for pursuing decolonization to a desire to maximize power for the state arguing that the demands of the G77 for the NIEO and altering the composition of existing international institutions confirms this. This can be further substantiated as newly independent states consistently exercise their sovereignty, which in many cases leads to human rights abuses on their own citizens. Liberals are in favor of institutions that promote this sovereign right. However, the realist will further say this is ‘organized hypocrisy’ and sovereignty is irrelevant without the power to back it up and are likely to make reference to the limited impact of the NIEO as evidence of this.

A widespread approach to analysis of change in world politics as a result of decolonization is looking at post colonial relationships and its impact on foreign policy. ”Most constructivist work on post-imperial ties, however, has focused on autonomous change in the normative framework of North-South relations (for instance, on decolonization …)” (Brysk, Parsons, & Sandholtz, 2002). Ideas, values and identity are recognized by the constructivist school as the catalyst for normative change during the decolonization process. The idea of granting sovereignty is a social construct from interaction and sharing of ideas.



Decolonization Transformations: What constitutes a major change in world politics?

According to neo-realists, “States dominate the transnational arena although the constitution of this arena is changing.” (Heller & Sofaer, 2001). Consequently changes in statehood and sovereignty can be considered major in global politics. According to Brown, the term ‘sovereignty’ refers to claims of autonomy of multiple political units, a distinguishing feature of international political theory (Brown, 2002). Sovereignty and Self determination are central as key drivers of decolonization and represent the significant desired and achieved changes to newly independent states in Asia and Africa. Hedley Bull cites five themes or phases in their “revolt against the west” namely the struggles for equal sovereignty, formal political independence, racial equality, economic justice and cultural liberation (Bull, 1984). This ‘revolt’ represented the start of a seismic shift in the universal international society dominated by European powers – economical, military, intellectual and cultural authority and institutional legality. Bull goes on to further highlight factors he believes represent what brought about the collapse of the old Western-dominated international order. A number of these were interwoven in the decolonization process and closely associated with a liberal view of normative change. There was the “psychological and spiritual awakening” of colonised peoples which led them to become more active in political affairs, the West gradually losing interest in maintaining the position of dominance, the rise of the Soviet Union and shifting power equilibrium. Pertinently the Afro-Asian movement, G77, and Non Aligned Movement efforts transformed the moral climate of the international order.

The motivation for decolonization to reduce Western dominance is commonly discussed in the name of ideas and values by constructivists even when these values are ‘western’. Stephen Krasner offers an alternative realist perspective by the assumption that “... Third World states like all states in the international system are concerned about vulnerability and threat ...” (Krasner S. D., 1985). The motivation for decolonization is as much for power and control as it is for wealth. The Asian and African nations desired more than anything control over international regimes so they could secure their interests and values.

From the Liberal perspective, even though after decolonization these nations remained dependent to varying degrees on their previous colonisers for their security their motivation and behaviour was as a result of state preferences, not capability. Liberal Institutionalism acquiesces that more representation in the UN was an effective vehicle to pursue these interests. The advantage was growing acknowledgement of the principle of sovereign equality of states, an area that constituted a change in world politics from a power and control perspective. According to Krasner “... Before the twentieth century ... great-power dominated sovereign equality ... In the present system, the principle of sovereign equality dominates that of great-power primacy” (Krasner S. D., 1985). The classical realist might downplay the importance of participation and institutionalism and propose that increased Afro-Asian vote and involvement in the United Nation did not represent a major change in world politics. Even where there might be a slight shift in the balance of power, the view is that the International society will always include strong states and weak states, real states and ‘quasi’ states possessing positive and negative sovereignty respectively. If world politics represents interaction between sovereign states, then the mere rise in the number of states sovereignty, regardless of its ‘hypocrisy’, determines a major change. The sheer increase in diplomatic activity within the United Nations demonstrates evolution of the international order, challenging the realist argument that it represents only a stage for the main actors to exercise their power.

Another limitation of the realist perspective in determining changes in world politics attributed to decolonization is in its primary premise that the main actors on the world stage are states. Assuming other actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations and rising number of non-governmental organisations all have to work within the framework of the state actually doesn’t address the phrase ‘world politics’ . A large number of states became legally sovereign as a result of decolonization, but in practise they have to interact and negotiate with all sorts of other actors and the freedom to act as they desire embodied in the right to self-determination is restricted. This re-enforces the liberal view of interdependence being important in world politics and the growing nature of this due to changing norms introducing new actors (for example international organizations promoting human rights) has been effected by decolonization.

Another relatable challenge could be to the realist notion that sovereignty is absolute. There is increasing concern in the global political landscape for human security, higher levels of human intervention and the dilution of the importance of sovereignty in such cases. Decolonization contributed to a proliferation of ‘failed’ states resulting from inability for effective self-rule and dependence on former colonial powers for economic aid and security. Christopher Clapham notes that the French readiness to intervene militarily in Africa in the post colonial period included operations in Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, Zaire and Western Sahara. Somewhat recent is Rwanda, where there was French direct military support for the regime in power. It could be argued by the constructivists’ school that growing civil war in newly independent African states influenced a changing norm of Human Intervention as ‘illegal but morally legitimate’. This norm of a higher moral cause as being important even where it infringes on a states’ sovereignty has spread and impacted world politics. In the last two decades we can see instances of this in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq and Darfur in Sudan. The growing use of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) language has been significant in international politics today and central to drafting of international law and various resolutions passed in the UN. Recognizing that decolonization contributed to the creation of these ‘failed’ states and served as a trigger to these events cannot be ignored as an impact on world politics.

Decolonization Transformations: When, where and how has this happened?

By the 1960s, after years of fighting for independence, most Western colonial territories had gained self-rule. The change in world politics was the newly independent nations’ quest to realize their identity in the international arena. According to the constructivist school, world politics is essentially determined by shared meanings, norms and ideas (Wendt, 1999). This was clearly demonstrated in what became the most symbolic and influential moment at attempts at decolonization – the famous Asian-African Conference at Bandung in Indonesia. The strong shared values of resistance to colonial domination, discrimination against race and rights to self determination served as the prelude to what Paul Lauren referred to as “the flood” where in just over a decade, the membership of the United Nations more than doubled eventually giving Afro-Asians a majority. This represented a major shift in world politics as they could now influence the agenda on a wide variety of subjects ranging from human rights and sovereignty to racial discrimination. The reverberation of this heightened level of consciousness and mounting international pressure was felt across the globe - politically, socially and culturally. There were implications for Canadian Immigration Bill of 1965, the British parliament passing the Race Relations, dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and Civil rights movement in the US. In the UN, numerous historic treaties and agreements were passed – UNESCO approved the 1962 Convention against Discrimination in Education, the notable 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Decolonization Continuities: What is perceived as unchanged?

Sovereignty, classical realists note, did not bring with it complete freedom from imperialist influences. Colonial legacies were visible in the desire of the new governments to keep the boundaries that were created during colonial times, in the promotion of ethnic rivalry, in the continuation of inhumane and unjust actions against minority populations, and in the practice of distributing the country's resources in an uneven manner. Also, after being under foreign rule for decades, newly independent governments often lacked governmental institutions, good governance skills, and the governing experience needed to effectively rule their newly sovereign nations. In most cases, the transition from colonial province to independent state was a violent and arduous journey.

The ‘morning after’ decolonization was a traumatic experience for a number of newly independent states as the “relationship with the former colonial power was the only substantial external relationship ...” (Clapham, 1996). In Africa the former metro pole continued to have extensive interests within the African state. This ‘new’ relationship was one in which the African State had least control. According to William Zartman, this ‘dependency approach’ (in contrast to decolonization theory, where the relationships are caught up in an evolutionary process) is used to explain Third world developmental problems. In his article written fifteen years after most of Africa received its independence, he notes that Europe is still present and influential in the continent. Despite sovereignty and self-determination, this didn’t seem to represent a change in the international system. Zartman says: “... the attainment of political sovereignty masks the reality of continued dependence on world economic structures, and calculations of power and interest within this dependency relationship explain underdevelopment”. (Zartman, Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?, 1976). Zartmans realist view that decolonization has not changed much due to continued dependence is analogous to Nkrumahs term Neo-Colonialism as ‘the last stage of Imperialism’. According to Nkrumah “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” (Nkrumah, 1965). The limitation with this generalisation is it doesn’t give much credence to the fact that any control is always indirect and it is the independent sovereign state that has direct control.

The unchanged structure of the United Nations Security Council and the permanent five members with veto power is often cited by realists as substantiation of decolonization being inconsequential. This assessment defines power from a limited perspective of primarily military and secondarily economic. There are a large number of newly independent states that are members of the UN, even though not one of the Permanent five members, but wield an enormous amount of ‘soft power’ . India is a good example. Since attaining independence in 1947, it is now recognized as one of the ‘rising’ powers alongside China and Brazil. Alongside its growing economic and military strength and capabilities, its unique strong nationalism and constructivist norm of identity, evident during and ever since the decolonization process, has been significant in defining a strong state in world politics.

The impact of decolonization in India on world politics: A brief case in point

North East and South Asia are regions in which powerful states in the contemporary world have extensive interests and therefore are central to world politics. These regions combined are home to nearly two-fifths of the world population. India’s location and demographics makes it geopolitically strategic to numerous contemporary issues such as nuclear proliferation, global economic crisis, climate change and the fight against terrorism. Decolonization and assertion of its sovereignty has eventually given India, leader of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), a prominent position in world affairs. India’s role in Afghanistan and Pakistan is pivotal and in an increasingly unipolar world with an arguably declining power of previous colonizers like Britain and France, its relationship with the US hegemony is acquiescent and improving. In 2006, the US and Indian governments struck a bilateral deal that recognizes India as a nuclear weapons power and Washington recognizes that in time India could become a valuable security partner. According to Ashton Carter , the deal’s impact would mostly be felt by the ‘in-betweens’ and the ‘stalwarts’ including the five states that are formally entitled to have nuclear weapons under the NPT (Carter, 2006). Even the classical realist looking from a purely power and security perspective would be slightly naive to suggest the impact of this on world politics is minimal.



Conclusion

What has been shown that all theoretical frameworks acquiesce that numerous changes in world politics can be attributed, as least in part to decolonization. Where there is some divergence is what represents major change and the importance of sovereignty. It’s been illustrated that realist explanations of decolonization transformations that focus on self-interested states competing for power or security, using economic and military instruments, is limited if it does not account for normative change. The constructivist view of collective norms and social identities in the Afro-Asian caucus of the UN and activities of the Non-Aligned Movement shaping elite beliefs and subsequent state behavior is congruent with the liberal stance that economic and political considerations are important, propagated by instruments such as more representative membership of international institutions. Whilst sovereignty was important motivation for decolonization, its’ symbolic value was of more essence for normative change and quasi states exercising their sovereignty impact was constricted. Finally the brief case study of India has demonstrated that nationalism and subsequent decolonization has enabled the state to evolve into a strategic player in world politics. The essence of the argument is this essay can be encapsulated in the words of British Prime minister, Harold Macmillan, in a speech to both houses of the South African parliament in February 1960: “The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.” (Harold Macmillan, 3 February 1960, in (Hyam & Louis, 2000))

 

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The Advantages and Disadvantages of Pursuing a Multilateral Approach to negotiations designed to get North Korea to abandon efforts to develop Nuclear Weapons

This essay seeks to show that whilst there are numerous advantages in a multilateral approach to get the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK) to acquiesce to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons, diplomatic momentum is mainly achieved in negotiations mostly where there is an effective bilateral approach. It is argued that a successful negotiation must focus on bilateral diplomacy and this initiates and supports multilateral negotiations. It is suggested that bilateral negotiations should preempt multilateral structures and as such the concept of ‘multi-bilateral’ negotiations provide the best platform and foundation for lasting success. It becomes evident that it is possible to continuously take advantage of the benefits of a multilateral approach based on the bilateral process used. It is argued that as long as bilateral negotiations are done with an overriding multilateral framework with adequate reporting and transparency, the perceived pitfalls, such as conflicting interests and legitimacy, can be mitigated. The question of the effectiveness of sanctions when applied either multilaterally or bilaterally is addressed. The position adopted is “Thinking Multilaterally but Acting Bilaterally” which has been suggested as the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) way (Acharya, 1999).


After clarifying the context in which the term ‘multilateral’ is used, a brief outline illustrates the common debates surrounding the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral negotiation. An assessment of how this has played out in the DPRK is discussed from primarily two perspectives, the period in the run up to the first nuclear crisis (1980 – 1992) culminating in a bilateral agreed framework between the DPRK and the US in 1994 and the first few years of this century including an assessment of the six party talks . Before concluding there is a brief appraisal of the current situation and suggestions as to how the current US administration of President Barack Obama might proceed based on the argument presented here.

What is Multilateral Diplomacy?

Multilateral diplomacy is defined as the management of international relations by negotiations among three or more states through diplomatic or governmental representatives without the services of a specialized secretariat (Boisard & Chossudovsky, 1997). ‘Multilateralism’ in the context of collective security, power or military intervention is slightly different than when used in the context of diplomatic negotiations. The latter is more relevant here. The rise of multilateral diplomacy has been made analogous to the rise in conferences where communication is conducted primarily by means of verbal face-to-face exchanges rather than in the traditional predominantly written style of bilateral diplomacy (Berridge, 2005). According to Ikenberry (2003), “Multilaterism involves the coordination of relations among three or more states according to a set of rules or principles … can be contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc bargaining or straightforward power politics …” (Ikenberry, 2003).

Why is multilateral diplomacy sometimes perceived as the right approach in North Korea?

In assessing negotiation approaches for ‘global problems’ such as nuclear proliferation, it is convenient to assume the liberalist stance of multilateral diplomacy. The commonly cited indispensable element of any negotiation would be to involve all parties with interests, implicit or explicit. Multilateralism has been encouraged by the strain in liberal thought which places emphasis on the importance of popular consent in sustaining government authority (Berridge, 2005). Apart from not being able to reach a mutually acceptable solution, doing otherwise could result in the loss of any symbolical value of consensus and credibility which are intrinsic in providing momentum for negotiations.

The proponents of multilateral diplomacy say that following the rise and growing influence of non state actors and NGOs in international politics, a predominantly bilateral approach for negotiations on nuclear proliferation would reduce their involvement. “Further complexity is added when attention is focused at the sub-state or transnational actor level as the motivations for of non-state actors are different from those associated with states” (Howlett, 2008). This however seems less relevant in North Korea.

A plethora of other reasons exist why multilateral diplomacy such as the six-party talks seems to make sense. Instruments of diplomacy such as economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure are thought to be weaker unless applied multilaterally. There is also the likelihood that a number of bilateral negotiations, where there are conflicting goals or methods, can derail an ongoing multilateral diplomatic effort. In addition, assuming the perspective of liberalism or political idealism that North Korea is a rational actor, consensus achieved in a multilateral framework could put enormous pressure for eventual compliance.

Why is it better to “Think Multilateral but act Bilateral”?

Despite the advantages of a multilateral approach presented thus far, bilateral strategies are more efficient and focused since there are fewer parties involved and therefore less coordination issues. It is easier to have more clarity of interests. Momentum can be maintained and agreements kept for longer periods as there are less exit options, collective action is at a minimum and it is less cumbersome to monitor compliance. The efficiency here provides additional flexibility in being able to deal with stumbling blocks or potential show stoppers as they are evident more quickly. The ability to act and have quicker agreements mitigates the likelihood of missing a “window of opportunity” which exists for solving each problem. It is unlikely that these opportunities will occur simultaneously in a multilateral context (Heppell, 1997). Bilateral diplomacy also addresses distinct differences in history, culture , force structure, domestic politics, intraregional animosities and economic development which are often lost in a complex multilateral framework especially where parties might be from different regions. This could explain the suggestion that transferring the structures of a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would be ineffective in the Asia Pacific region (Heppell, 1997).

There are some examples of bilateral negotiations that have been criticized. The US’ attempts to persuade North Korea to join the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (hereafter NPT) in the 1980s, the DPRK’s and South Korea’s attempted implementation of their bilateral 1991 agreement to limit nuclear activities not in the NPT and the US and North Korea’s Agreed Framework in 1994. Its proponents have suggested that even though its future is uncertain, the six party talks was a multilateral strategy that gave impetus to negotiations. Notwithstanding, the 1994 Agreed Framework combined with The DPRK’s ascension to the NPT contributed in no small way to freezing plutonium production for nearly a decade. What was missing during this period was a series of other bilateral negotiations between other parties with interests. Pertinent also was China’s unwillingness during this period to use its influence to persuade North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections(Park, 2005). “To critics, the Agreed Framework undermined the NPT regime because it allowed North Korea to remain in violation of its safeguards obligations … To its supporters, the Agreed Framework accepted a delay in the North Korea’s compliance with safeguards in exchange for achieving a freeze on North Korea’s plutonium program which, if left hindered, could have produced much larger quantities of plutonium … “(Chipman, 2004). The framework agreement also bought time. Ted Carpenter notes that a 1999 report by the Clinton administration stated that without the freeze the agreement brought, North Korea could have produced 50 nuclear weapons in the intervening years. That they did not do so “is a solid achievement.”(Carpenter & Bandow, 2004)

Are sanctions less effective when applied bilaterally?

North Korea is under intense strain internally politically and economically. It has progressively got weaker despite recent attempts at economic reform . In general debates about sanctions, the impression is that they are weak and ineffective unless applied multilaterally. For North Korea however there are a number of reasons why this impression may be flawed.

There is one dominant nation with considerable influence on North Korea – China. North Korea depends on China for the bare necessities to keep it afloat i.e. food, energy and medicines. According to Shen (2009), “China is expected to play a significant role in changing North Korea’s nuclear course due to the economic bond between Beijing and Pyongyang, as well as their traditional bilateral defense ties” (Shen, 2009). Where a country has one significant trading partner, what becomes pertinent is the exploitation of the bilateral relationship in an effort to get North Korea to be less belligerent. One repeatedly cited example where this was used to great effect was in 2003 when China cut off oil supply for three days in a thinly veiled threat, citing ‘technical problems’ as the reason. The DPRK got the message and this tool altered its position toward the Three-Party Talks instigated by China in the lead up to the Six-Party talks. (Shen, 2009).

Consensus is often exceptionally difficult to reach in a multilateral forum. The debates range from how long sanctions should last for, how stringent they should be and what should form part of the sanctions. Heppell (1997) illustrates this in a section on ‘Factors promoting and preventing multilateral consensus on sanctions’. She lists all the reasons for supporting or opposing sanctions respectively for each of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US (Heppell, 1997). This outline shows how diverse the reasons for support or lack of support of sanctions are. Even where there is a consensus, when reasons for support are based on conflicting interests, it could end up being counter-productive.

Is the assumption that only sanctions or diplomatic pressure applied from as many sources as possible lead to compliance correct? The liberalist supposition that North Korea is a rational actor and behaves as such seems to lack the depth of analysis needed to assess how the DPRK has responded similarly in the past and circumstances that might make it act unpredictably. In 1993, sudden additional pressure from the US, Russia and China, caused the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT, which was the opposite of the desired effect (Chipman, 2004).

How could timing, transparency and reporting mitigate perceived drawbacks of Bilateral Negotiations?

Chipman (2004) additionally notes that following North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “The US decided to engage in direct talks with North Korea, calculating that diplomatic pressure and the threat of sanctions wouldn’t be sufficient to disarm Pyongyang. Moreover, key players like China, Russia, South Korea and Japan made it clear they would not support tougher measures unless Washington first tried to resolve the issue through dialogue with Pyongyang”(Chipman, 2004). This highlights that timing and intuitive scheduling starting with a focus of bilateral negotiations in a multilateral context is significant.

Reiss (2006-07) cites a number of possible drawbacks of separate bilateral negotiations, especially where conflicting methods and goals are involved (Reiss, 2006-07). There is potentially a feeling of being ‘left out’, isolation and even resentment if there is any mistrust that your interests are not being bolstered in bilateral talks you are not directly involved in. One conundrum the US faces at the moment is the inevitable pressure from China and Russia it expects to face as a result of any bilateral talks directly with North Korea. This occurred previously in the run up to the 1994 Agreed Framework when South Korea and Japan expressed dissatisfaction at their positions being negotiated by the US. This drawback is significantly mitigated if these formed part of a larger multilateral framework where all interested and affected parties are aware they would get their own say at the table. It does mean however for example, if the six-party talks were organized in separate bilateral meetings there would need to be a total of 15 separate negotiations taking place. Despite its perceived complexity, this is essential to assuage stalling and if strategically timed and scheduled, maintains diplomatic momentum. This structure allows maximizing “windows of opportunity” as they arise and a series of quick wins add up to visible progress.

The reality is that multilateral negotiations are more complex. According to Aviel (2005), “Multilateral negotiation is characterized by multi-parties, multi-issues, multi-roles, and multi-values. The level of complexity is far greater in a multilateral conference than in bilateral diplomacy, as is the level of skill needed to manage that complexity” (Aviel, 2005). The exact nature of administering the larger multilateral framework, the what, how, when and who, is therefore crucial.

According to Reiss (2006-07), “Bilateral talks make it easier for Pyongyang to pit the allies against the US”. Despite this he goes on to conclude “None of these arguments is reason enough for the United States not to negotiate directly with North Korea …” (Reiss, 2006-07).

An example where conflicting bilateral goals and methods have been an impediment is in North Korea and South Korea talks running alongside North Korea and US talks. Whilst South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun wants to improve economic relations with counterparts in the North via his “Peace and Prosperity Policy”, Washington has tried to force North Korea to abandon its efforts to develop nuclear weapons through economic pressure. John S. Parks cites ‘Unveiling Divergences’ by looking at what priority the key players have for each of the key issues namely Nuclear Proliferation, Refugees, Ballistic Missiles and Korean Re-unification with interesting results. He mentions this conflicting bilateral diplomatic negotiation and economic policy when he discusses South Korea (Park, 2005).

It is argued that conducting these separate negotiations, with openness and adequate reporting, at different times in a previously agreed sequence as part of a multilateral framework, would have alleviated the chance of a fall out from conflicting goals and methods. Reporting formed a key component of the success of bilateral talks during US and North Korea negotiations that lead to the signing of the 1994 Framework agreement. China, South Korea and Japan were regularly being updated on progress made and numerous meetings between high ranking officials ensured conflicting interests did not stall the process. One added benefit of efficient reporting and transparency is that it significantly reduces constructivists’ perspective that multilateral agreements are the only form of negotiated agreements that bring legitimacy.

How could this approach be used to address the current crisis in North Korea?

North Korea has tested two nuclear weapons in 2009 and left a conundrum in the laps of the Obama administration. Following North Korea’s exit from the six-party framework and its uncertain pessimistic future, Niksch (2009) has suggested an approach similar to this essay’s argument, that is bilateral talks in a multilateral framework – and he also seeks to start to answer the previous question of the administration of the larger multilateral framework. He says “… offer North Korea bilateral negotiations with the United States outside of the six party framework. This likely would mean the end of the six party talks as an actual forum for negotiations, although it might continue as a nominal institution to ratify any final US-North Korean denuclearization agreement” (Niksch, 2009)

Very recently, North Korea has signaled its willingness to resume talks. In a tone comparable with this essay’s argument that bilateral discussions must pre-empt any multilateral talks, the North Korean leadership has indicated they would consider talks with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and US in six-party talks, provided it had direct talks with Washington . The suggested way forward could be a series of bilateral meetings very similar to how in 2003 China institutionalized previous trilateral negotiations with a three stage hypothetical road map, when they hosted the first round of the six party talks. “The road map was also intended to provide an example of how structured multilateral negotiations can enable the parties to move beyond the nuclear deadlock” (Park, 2005). The use of the term ‘structured multilateral’ in essence corresponds to a series of bilateral negotiations in a multilateral scheduled framework or ‘multi-bilateral’ as mentioned earlier.

For almost 5 years, under the last US Republican administration of George W. Bush, the ‘hawks’ pursued a policy of multilateral negotiation through the six-party talks with a combination of diplomatic and economic pressure. The successes of this approach, which directly opposes the North Korean regimes consistent request for bilateral talks, have been limited. According to Reiss (2006-07), “Three years of Six-Party Talks have yielded little … the strategic positions of the other parties continue to erode” (Reiss, 2006-07). Supporters of direct bilateral negotiation argue that “… although the United States has limited coercive measures remaining, it has ample positive leverage for pushing forward on an agreement with North Korea … the multilateral coalition will be stronger if the United States tries a bilateral approach first, indicating its good faith to other parties” (Chanlett-Avery & Squassoni, 2006). With this model in mind, it could be suggested that a good start is for US, China and North Korea to engage in bilateral and trilateral talks initially. President Obama’s recent visit to Asia, particularly China is arguably the first step. The North Korea issue is at the heart of the Sinio-American relationship, which is a bilateral relationship that remains the key driver for any form of multilateral negotiations.



Conclusion

A combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiation strategies is the essence of progress in North Korea. The focus however must be on bilateral negotiations that pre-empt a framework that suggests “Thinking multilaterally, but acting bilaterally”. This reduces the impact of perceived weaknesses of bilateral approach such as less effective sanctions and conflicting goals and methods. The discussion around the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions, has suggested that as long as sanctions applied bilaterally are consistent and by a major trading partner, such as China in the case of North Korea, they will be as effective. As long as the overriding multilateral framework has transparency and is cloaked by efficient reporting , no issues of isolation, belligerence or lack of consensus would arise. This then leaves room to take advantage of the efficiency and focus of bilateral negotiations which has long been the demand and motivation of the North Korean regime. Lastly, following the recent nuclear tests this year, it is believed that President Obama’s recent trip to Asia is congruent with the main thesis of this essay and serves to be the first step bilaterally to be followed by subsequent bilateral negotiations before a wider multilateral framework.





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